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Developing safety cooperation in construction: between facilitating independence and 
tightening the grip 
Abstract 
Cooperation about safety and joint responsibility between managers and workers is one of 
the cornerstones of health and safety work. However, attempts at ensuring safety in the 
workplace run the risk of focusing on formalities and compliance rather than on joint 
engagement in safety. Drawing on an understanding of safety as practice, this study 
attempts to empirically unpack the difference between cooperation as engaging with local 
knowledges and the disciplining of unsafe behaviour. The research involved an 
ethnographic study at two large construction sites in Denmark and follows empirical 
examples of how safety breaches are identified, catalogued, and revealed later on at safety 
meetings. Managers saw this as an attempt to engage the workers. However, the workers 
saw this as a punitive way of criticising their work at a distance. They felt that this practice 
of moving safety from the construction site and in to meeting rooms ran counter to aims of 
establishing engaging and effective safety practices close to the work. Efforts to engage 
workers in safer ways of working should therefore acknowledge the integrated nature of 
safety practice and the value placed on independence, discretion and negotiation when 
developing cooperation about workplace safety. 
 






Construction has a disproportionately high rate of recorded accidents (Eurostat 2010), and 
the Danish construction sector is no exception (Grill et al. 2017, Tómasson et al. 2011). In 
addition to fatal accidents, the need to address less severe injuries or more latent 
occupational ill health represents a moral as well as economic challenge. Over the years, 
working environment regulations have become an essential tool for attempts to reduce 
workplace accidents and improve health and safety at work (i.e. Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union article 153; Work environment Act 2010; Zwetsloot et al. 2017). In 
the efforts to introduce safer working environments in construction, statutory injunctions 
have included prescriptions to employ a joint management and worker involvement in 
safety, in the Danish context this is termed cooperation about safety. This has produced a 
range of behaviour based safety programs, safety management programmes and safety 
culture programmes (i.e. BFA 2013, DeJoy 2005, Sherratt et al. 2013, Tharaldsen and 
Haukelid 2009, Antonsen 2009, Hale and Borys 2013ab, Jia et al. 2019). Sherratt and 
colleagues have identified these programmes as operating at the nexus of two different 
discourses in construction safety management; firstly a discourse of "enforcement", 
referring to obligations to ensure and sanction safety in the form of laws and regulations, 
such as safety meetings, clearly stated rules and responsibilities for safety (defined by Hale 
and Borys (2013a) as a top-down classical, rational approach), and secondly a discourse of 
"engagement", largely advocated in the literature and language of safety culture (defined 
by Hale and Borys (2013a) as a bottom- up constructive approach). This latter approach 
aims at enabling people to take responsibility for their own safety by constantly choosing 
safety (Sherratt et al. 2013). Safety culture, however, has also been criticised for essentially 
being a management tool aimed at diffusing management values under the guise of the 
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‘right’ safety culture (Antonsen 2009). These discourses cover many aspects of safety 
management, but they have also been shown to work against the intentions of creating 
safer construction sites and lowering incident rates (Jia et al. 2017, Provan et al. 2019).    
 
One reason that has been suggested as to why safety management programmes have been 
difficult to deploy in construction is the industries’ organization and working conditions. 
The construction industry differs from other industries with regards to environmental, 
organizational and individual factors (Andersen et al. 2015, Shipton et al. 2014, Törner and 
Pousette 2009, Chan and Räisanen 2009). Formal safety rules aiming at directing safety 
behaviour can stand in contrast to the ways in which work environment and safety are 
practiced (Ozmec et al. 2015, Thiel 2007, Tharaldsen and Haukelid 2009, Tutt et al. 2013, 
Löwstedt 2015). Often regulations do not match the craftsmen's experience of, for 
example: how plans are negotiated to meet different demands; how a sense of security is 
established in practical work; or how work practice is characterised (Bourrier and Bieder 
2013, Grytnes 2018, Pedersen 2012, Löwstedt 2015). Wilson's description from 1989 of 
the difference between "mechanic" and "organic" organisations still holds relevance here 
(Wilson 1989). In his description, mechanistic types of organisations are characterised by 
stable environments allowing for close supervision, implementation of rules and 
procedures, and with less need for decision making at lower levels in the organisation. Yet, 
in organic types of organisations (of which examples can be found in construction) the 
opposite holds true, as construction operations are dynamic, being carried out from 
temporary structures, such as scaffolding, staging and falseworks, through to permanent 
structures under erection, and therefore are not completely safe themselves (Wilson, 1989: 
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305). This means that rules and procedures can become hard to apply to the complex needs 
of construction work (ibid, p. 304).   
 
Another reason that has been suggested as to why safety management programmes have 
been difficult to deploy in construction is related to the differences of opinion as to what 
safety is and how it is achieved. Antonsen (2009) has pointed to the concept of safety 
culture as being one of the institutions of safety that runs the risk of contributing to a 
standardized notion of what safety is by diffusing company (management) values towards 
safety to the operative parts of the organization (ibid).  Also, Jia and colleagues find that 
the ‘weak link between safety initiatives and desired behavioural outcomes … can find its 
roots in the production system and the societal cultural contexts where various incentives, 
constraints, values and beliefs seemingly irrelevant to safety, but in effect, are premising 
individual decisions’ (Jia et al. 2017: 338).   
 
The statutory obligation to foster joint engagement of the parties (workers and 
management) through a shared, common responsibility for health and safety parallels an 
increased professionalization and institutionalization of health and safety work. This has 
led to standardization of safety through measurement procedures, i.e. audits and risk 
evaluations (Daudigeos et al. 2017, Provan et al. 2019). It is actively debated whether the 
application of standards and rules to ensure safety has any positive effect in construction 
(Bourrier and Bieder 2013, Busby and Izzat-White 2016, Dekker 2014, Grill et al. 2017, 
Grote et al. 2009, Hale and Borys 2013ab, Hasle et al. 2014, Jeschke et al. 2017, Kines et 
al. 2013, Swuste et al. 2012, Zalk et al. 2011). Given the changing and uncertain conditions 
in construction, Grote and colleagues point to the need to enable each member of the 
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organization to handle uncertainties locally, supported by planning through “lateral, task 
induced coordination” (Grote 2009:19). However, while local handling allows for 
discretion and independent judgment on behalf of individual workers, it also opens up the 
potential for individual misjudgment and unwanted incidents (that may then be blamed on 
the individual), even if the ability of individuals to judge and make discretionary decisions 
is what many construction companies applaud (Löwstedt 2015, Thiel 2007, Tutt et al. 
2013). In construction, registration of misses and near- misses, or tight safety regulation 
aimed at a joint process of "learning from mistakes", seem to demotivate workers 
(Andersen et al. 2015, Sherratt et al. 2013, Oswald et al. 2018, Busby and Izzat-White 
2016). The reason seems to be that safety rules and regulations foster accountability to the 
rules, instead of safety itself (Jia et al. 2017: 350). Thus, safety becomes decoupled from 
the daily meaningful handling of tasks and challenges (Gherardi et al. 1998, Gherardi and 
Nicolini 2002, Ozmec et al. 2015, Jia et al. 2017). This can seem paradoxical, as the 
involvement of workers in organizational learning processes is generally acknowledged as 
central when it comes to improving safety performance (Bell 2018, DeJoy 2005, Grill et al. 
2017, Kines et al. 2013, Lund and Aarø 2004). However, Bell (2018) has found that even 
though the terms "worker involvement" and "worker engagement" are often used, it is 
unclear what these terms refer to; whether they aim to establish adherence to safety 
management procedures, or if they aim towards creating commitment to working safely 
onsite.   
 
Across different international contexts, employers are tasked with introducing formal 
mechanisms for worker representation, which typically involve consulting with 
representatives from the workforce through some form of safety committee (Bell 2018, 
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HSE 2014; ISO 45001:2019). As already mentioned, legislation, or associated guidance, 
sometimes clarifies these duties, for example employers should involve workers in 
assessing risk (HSE 2014), and workers must notify employers of situations posing 
imminent and serious danger (Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
1999 (Statutory Instrument No.3242)). A range of mechanisms for involving workers in 
health and safety are advocated by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), such as pre-
task briefings (to discuss hazards and coordinate activities), joint risk assessments, and 
near miss and hazard-reporting systems (with sustained commitment to these schemes 
reliant on proactive management, such as acting and feeding back on suggestions and near 
miss reports).  Within this context, the question remains as to whether involving workers in 
these formal safety management procedures amounts to engaging workers in establishing 
safer work practices at the workplace, or whether these practices are merely a maneuver 
aimed at persuading workers to adopt the right behavior and thereby fulfilling safety 
management tasks.  In the background is a need to address the more complicated issues of 
how to bring about change in the management of risk and safety to make it relevant for 
safe working through probing into the experiences of the quality of cooperation and 
involvement, and the possibilities for engagement from different elements of the workforce 
(Oswald et al. 2018, Bell 2014, Edirisinghe and Lindgard 2016). The ways that safety 
cooperation is practiced, e.g. through safety committee meetings and safety audits, and in 
relation to the competing discourses of safety enforcement and safety engagement (Sherratt 
et al, 2013), are extremely pertinent to our research study. We aim to illuminate the two 
discursive practices of enforcement and engagement in the management of safety, focusing 
on how the practice of cooperation about safety is linked not only to safety culture but also 
to power (Antonsen 2009). As discursive practices are theoretical constructs, we focus on 
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the often inconsistent efforts of management to facilitate independence and involvement of 
workers whilst, often concurrently, tightening the grip and cracking down on rule- 
violations. Our theoretical framing of power as surveillance within this context will be 
further detailed in the next section. 
 
Methodology: The practice of safety as surveillance 
In order to unpack the empirical practices of cooperation around safety on construction 
sites, we draw on two different notions of safety. Gherardi and colleagues’ have defined 
safety as an integrative and essentially collective practice (Gherardi et al. 1998). As such 
safety is not something in itself (i.e. privileged or standalone knowledge); it is rather a 
doing, an integrated attribute of everybody’s practice on site. However, this perspective 
does not adequately address the professionalised safety-specific practice, in which safety in 
some senses is something in itself (Jia et al. 2017). Therefore, in order to be able to 
distinguish between the differences of opinion, with regard to how safety is achieved, we 
also draw on an understanding of safety as positioned and essentially powered (Hale and 
Borys 2013a, Antonsen 2009). This perspective considers safety knowledge as something 
dynamic, diverse and sometimes contested (Pottier et al. 2003), and as inherently 
improvisational (Baarts 2009), while at the same time challenging the organizational 
practice of standardizing safety (Tharaldsen and Haukelid 2009). To this end, Pink and 
colleagues (2010) draw attention to the importance of an understanding of safety as "local 
knowledge", or rather localized knowledge. This means that in order to understand what 
construction managers or construction workers know requires attention to the detail of their 
everyday practical activities, common beliefs, values and discourses in which this 
knowledge is manifested, as contextualised in specific institutional practices (Pink et al. 
8 
 
2010, p.651). Empirically, however, local knowledge can be difficult to pinpoint given that 
the concept of a locality is itself difficult to apply to the realities of construction sites. 
Studying safety practice in construction suggests an understanding of knowing as 
constituted through regular interactions with specific other people (other workers, 
managers), materialities (tools, equipment, materials), institutions (companies, agencies) 
and discourses (Nicolini and Monteiro 2017). It thus involves interacting in a recognizable 
environment that might be reconstituted in rather different configurations for different jobs, 
drawing on a situated and inherently hierarchical body of construction knowing, that is 
experienced and mobilized in practice. 
 
In order to understand the contested and essentially powered nature of the management of 
safety, and the potential conflict between worker engagement in safety and the 
enforcement of safety rules, we also draw on Foucault's (1977) theory of disciplinary 
power. This theory builds on a description of Bentham’s eighteenth-century Panopticon, a 
prison design aiming at making it possible for the few to surveil the many. The theory of 
disciplinary power helps explain how surveillance in relation to safety management can 
lead to self-surveillance and self-monitoring. In theory, the practice of observation (the 
gaze) can, through the anticipation of the authoritative gaze, introduce self-regulating 
behaviour and self-surveillance of subjects. Foucault describes how the institutional gaze 
operates through “the meticulousness of the regulations, the fussiness of the inspections, 
the supervision of the smallest fragment of life and of the body” (Foucault 1977, p.140). In 
our case, for construction workers the recording of unsafe practices at construction sites 
can be seen to represent “meticulous observation of detail and at the same time a political 




Yet, as we will discuss, this inspecting gaze does not necessarily end by “interiorization to 
the point that he is his own overseer” with each worker exercising this surveillance over, 
and against, him/herself and other workers (Foucault 1977, p.154). Workers can voice a 
resistance to attempts at internalising this practice as a norm, as construction work 
continuously calls for locally based judgement, the need for good relations and the 
construction of intentions (Busby and Izzat-White 2016). From the literature we know that 
observation, as a safety management system, can take different forms and can be used in 
different ways in terms of detection and monitoring activities. Wachter and Yorio (2014) 
differentiate between the different uses of observational methodologies in safety 
management systems, finding examples “where workers use a list of defined critical 
behaviors, observe workers for these behaviors, and provide feedback”, within traditional 
behavior-based safety systems (ibid, p.117). They distinguish this approach from, what 
they see as, more advanced behaviour-based systems, such as antecedent-behavior-
consequence systems, which can “uncover and correct organizational barriers (i.e., 
management system deficiencies) that inhibit safe acts (and therefore accidents) from 
occurring” (ibid, p. 117). Their findings link strongly with Foucault’s ideas of (unequal) 
power relationships and surveillance. For, they state that “when a violation is observed, 
organizations can handle it in different ways” (Wachter and Yorio 2014, p. 122), and it is 
how the knowledge is wielded which determines the level of safety cooperation between 
management and the workforce. It can range from negative sanctions being enforced when 
workers deviate from a safety rule, through to the use of information and safety 
observation as a way to develop a participatory problem-solving process. So the 
differential use of these observational practices can be seen in relation to the dichotomy of 
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approaches (engagement/enforcement), as the lens is widened from the level of practice to 
that of system. Drawing on the understanding of safety as practice, built from interwoven 
patterns of different and positioned/powered forms of knowledges, and on the Foucauldian 
notion of surveillance, we attempt to empirically unpack the difference between 
disciplining unsafe behaviour and engaging with local knowledges regarding risk and 
safety.     
 
Methods: how is cooperation about safety performed?  
This study is based on a qualitative multi case study (Flyvbjerg 2006) of two large 
construction sites in Denmark. It is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out over a 
period of eight months. The first and the third author spent 2 days a week for four months 
at each site. Both authors have previously carried out field studies at other construction 
sites, and our access was negotiated through our direct contact with the main contractors. 
Site 1 was first recruited through our participation in a health and safety meeting, where 
the third author had been invited to speak about the project. After learning about our 
project in the meeting, the main contractor of one of the projects volunteered to participate 
in the study. Research access to Site 2 was more speculative, in that we identified the site 
just by driving by, and then contacted the site manager explaining in an email what the 
project was about. He agreed to set up a meeting with the group of managers in which we 
presented the project. Site 1 was part of a larger hospital construction project organised as 
a turnkey contract, with several sub-contractors, and the third author had already carried 
out a different research project in earlier stages of the hospital construction project. At the 
time of our study, approximately 40 workers and 4-5 subcontracting firms were 
represented on site. Site 2 was organized as a turnkey contract as well, but was also a so 
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called public- private cooperation, where the contractor had responsibility for the 
maintenance of the building for 15 years after completion of the project. Around 30 
workers from 4 different sub-contractors were at the site at the time of our study. The 
workers we refer to here were doing a range of work tasks and had different professional 
backgrounds, as;  electricians, carpenters, plumbers, metal workers, crane operators and   
workers doing in-situ concrete and rebar work as well as mounting concrete elements. As 
fieldwork took place in the early phases of the projects, at both site 1 and 2, the majority of 
the workers were directly employed by the main contractor undertaking concrete work.  
 
In order to illuminate the daily practices and the different local knowledges in play in the 
construction of site safety cooperation, we used ethnographic methods (Pink et al. 2012, 
Spradley 1980). In construction research these methods have been applied in different 
ways (Baarts 2009, Tutt et al. 2013, Löwstedt 2015, Thiel 2007, Grytnes 2018, Jia et al. 
2019) but the common characteristic is that the researcher to some extent takes part in the 
research field studied, and does that from a certain position; a specific role offered him or 
her – often as apprentice or visitor but it could also be as a researcher unskilled in the work 
done. For this particular study, the first and the last author conducted the fieldwork, and 
were sometimes at site together, sometimes one at the time. At the outset of the study, we 
presented ourselves in the common canteen (Site 1) and in the workers huts (Site 2) where 
we briefly introduced the project and our interest in cooperation about safety. During these 
meetings the workers had many questions for us, and wanted to debate and explain their 
notion of safety. Due to our previous experience with construction research, we knew some 
of the workers in advance and this might have facilitated the open discussions and their 
willingness to participate. They also came forward with criticism of previous studies for 
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not having delivered the ‘safety’ that they had hoped for when they agreed to participate. 
Our methods and questions were influenced by these initial discussions as well as by our 
theoretical understanding of cooperation about safety as being part of relational and 
hierarchical practices linked to practical tasks at work. We took up the opportunities to 
take part in formal safety and production meetings as well as in site walks with the safety 
managers (with in- house managers as well as consulting safety managers). We also 
walked around the site by ourselves, talking to and observing what was going on in the 
different work groups. Our role was that of the visitor and observer and only in very few 
instances did we engage in the work directly (for comparison of other roles see Löwstedt 
2019, Baarts 2009, Thiel 2007). However, being present on a frequent basis over a longer 
period of time meant that our presence was not something unusual, and most often went 
unnoticed by the workers. Occasionally it was commented on in a joking manner, and we 
were welcomed as ‘the guest of the week’. We regularly talked with the foremen and the 
site managers through informal talks as we arrived at site, during site safety walks and in 
meetings. Alternating between workers and management was important in order to be able 
to study the empirical examples of how safety was practiced; in conducting the actual work 
tasks safely or unsafely and in conducting specific identification of safety breaches. 
Undoubtedly, this method meant that we were not seen as ‘natives’ or ‘one of the workers’. 
Evidently, due to a specific instance onsite, we became seen as the ‘managers extended 
arm’, which highlights how safety – and our fieldwork investigating it – is inherently a part 
of a powered practice, as we will explore further below.  
 
In order to be allowed to walk around the sites, we sat in on obligatory safety induction at 
Site 1, while at Site 2 only safety equipment such as helmets and jackets were given to us. 
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Otherwise no particular instructions were given. Consent from sub- contractors was 
obtained directly with them, and we were given permission to access all workers and lower 
management (foremen, gang leaders) of all sub-contractors. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with workers from the main contractor as well as sub- contractors, with 
foremen, site managers, site safety managers, and sub-contractors, builders and consulting 
engineers; comprising a total of 34 interviews (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Overview of interviews 






Site 1 Workers: 
- Rebar/ in-situ 
concrete: 4 
 
Foremen: 3   
 
Site managers/ site safety 
managers: 2  
 
Project managers: 1  
Workers: 
- In-situ concrete/ rebar: 
2 
- Electricians: group 
- Carpenters: 2 
- Earth and sewage: 
group 
 
H&S consultant: 2 
 
H&S director: 1 
 
In all Site 1 
 
4 + 6 4, 2 groups + 3 





Foremen: 2   
 
Site managers/site safety 
managers: 3   
Project managers: 1    
Workers: 
- Earth and sewage: 
group 




Consulting engineers: 2 
 
In all Site 2 
 







Interviews with different managers were arranged directly with them, and interviews with 
workers, sub-contractors management and builders were either arranged directly by us, or 
arranged with the help of site managers.  
 
The ethnographic fieldwork conducted can be characterized as an abductive practice of 
staying open to what happens whilst keeping attentive towards ones focus of interest. The 
analysis of data was an ongoing pragmatic process to ‘puzzle out’ what was special, 
important and surprising in what we observed and learned during fieldwork (Figure 1). In 
this process we aimed at constructing knowledge of the issues at stake, rather than 
discovering objective truths (Löwstedt 2015, Pink et al. 2010). For example, for the 
interviews we prepared a semi structured guide covering the topics that we wanted to 
investigate, i.e. we asked the participants to give examples of situations where they 
cooperated around safety, or where they did not. As we proceeded with the study, new 
issues arose, and we often pursued new abductive possibilities, as we followed up about 
situations we had observed on site or in meetings, or we discussed, reasoned and tested our 








Datatypes (field notes from observations and transcriptions of the recorded interviews) 
were analysed with the aim of producing knowledge about the context of the work at the 
sites and the specific situations in which different safety perceptions and cooperation 
practices involving safety developed. Initial analysis started during fieldwork, and then 
after fieldwork all the transcribed interviews along with our field notes were read through 
closely. We made a list of coding themes and concepts derived from our previous 
theoretical understandings as well as from the ideas and thoughts that the initial analysis 
generated during field work. These themes were: collaboration, cooperation, double safety 
standards, risk, safety and control, sense of security, planning, rules and procedures, safety 
as negotiation, technic and things, trust, causes of accidents/ incidents, and methodological 
issues. The data material was coded according to these themes and discussed among the 
authors. During the coding process new themes emerged, especially the issue of safety as 
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control and surveillance. Through discussions among the authors, Foucault’s theories about 
the Panopticon were identified as a highly relevant lens through which to re-read and think 
through the data set. As such, this process of analysing the material opened up possible 
avenues to understanding the problem of how safety cooperation is established vertically 
and horizontally at the construction site, and why safety cooperation is often a source of 
conflict between different groups. We coded and categorized the data material with the 
help of the software program NVivo 11.  
 
By employing a case study design, we sought to engage with local knowledge at the work 
sites, and aimed to collect rich qualitative data to illuminate how safety cooperation is 
acted out through everyday practice at the construction site. This research does not 
therefore aim to display facts about safety collaboration (Sherratt et al. 2013), but rather to 
understand how safety practice unfolds and is understood by its practitioners through 
extended researcher- engagement (Pink et al. 2010, Pink et al. 2017). In the following 
section, three themes will be analysed. Namely, safety cooperation within the formal 
structure (meetings),  ‘being stabbed’ as a form of safety cooperation, and safety 
cooperation as the negotiation of solutions These emergent themes are evident throughout 
the material and the analysis draws on the full dataset collected across the two construction 
sites. The analysis will be illustrated through examples from the field notes and transcribed 
interviews.       










Safety meetings: safety collaboration within the formal structure 
  
Safety meetings are obligatory under law and are intended to involve both workers and 
management on site. At the two sites, these safety meetings were held every fortnight and 
provided the formal structuring of safety cooperation between representatives from main 
contractor management and (representatives of) workers and sub- contractor management 
and representatives of trade contractor workers. At both sites the main contractor safety 
managers (who were also site managers) ran the meetings, following a relatively fixed 
schedule. They would always start with the safety manager going through the minutes from 
the previous meeting, after which a range of practical, and some almost trivial, issues 
would be discussed, which included: current staffing, changes in the coming week, start-up 
of new workers, status and progress of the work from each contractor and implications of 
this for safety, safety measures taken since last meeting, accidents and near-misses, notices 
or charges from the Working Environment Authority, and so forth. The issues discussed in 
the meetings were mostly retrospective in character, passing on information about 
agreements already reached at the work site or in other meetings. Yet, the safety managers 
did attempt to involve workers representatives from both main contractor and sub- 
contractors in decisions about current problems by asking them to bring in their knowledge 




Towards the end of the meeting, the safety manager takes up issues that he encountered 
during this week’s site safety walks: 'It still looks very nice', he says looking around the 
table, 'there is a staircase that is missing cover, but we have arranged for it to be taken 
care of'. He goes on to praise one of the sub-contractors for purchasing an electric-
powered truck to drive inside the building. Then he turns to the problem caused by the 
weather conditions: 'we have water on the floors, what do we do?' he says. He seeks to 
engage the participants, and some of them suggest they lay out sand, to absorb the water. 
(Field notes from Site 1).    
 
The example illustrates the type of issues brought up in site safety meetings; mostly 
practical, trivial matters related to potential safety issues concerning daily operations on 
site. It also illustrates how the site safety manager attempted to engage participants; he sets 
the agenda, but asks around the table inviting the sub-contractors and his or her own people 
to find solutions to current on site problems that might pose a risk to the health and safety 
of the workers. However, as an involving practice, it generates little ‘engagement in safety’ 
from the meeting participants. The site safety manager’s acknowledgment of the sub-
contractor, for purchasing the electric-powered truck, is translated into an act of improving 
safety, as it lowers emissions and improves air quality in the building – even if the 
motivation for the sub-contractor may have been quite different. As a practice, the 
institutional logic of the meeting is to involve representatives of workers and managers 
(from both main-and sub-contractors). Safety, in these meetings, is closely linked to 
production and to the hierarchical structures. As such, it illustrates the often banal, albeit 
selective, focus on safety as linked to, but also separated from, safety as practiced. Risks 
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(of water on the floor) are pointed out and can be seen as an educational endeavor on 
behalf of the safety manager in guiding the representatives’ vision.  
  
In the series of meetings that we participated in, the foremen or managers’ talk was often 
informative and directive in the sense that they reminded people of what they should do, 
for example the "injunction to use helmets at all times". At Site 2 the foreman from the 
main contractor followed up on this, noting that "this means that every gang or sub-
contractor must enforce this with their own people. And we will take care of our own", and 
he continued "at some point we'll be 100 people here and if we don't enforce this with our 
own, it will be a full- time job to keep an eye on this". He continued, by looking towards 
the sub- contractors and saying, "the crane is in operation at all times, which means that 
even if you work inside most of the time, when you go out of the building, there is a risk". 
The injunction to wear helmets at all times is delivered as information, but it is followed up 
with an obligation on behalf of low level management and safety representatives to police 
their own group. In the site safety meetings, safety was broadly codified as ‘risks’ that the 
representatives of the workers and managers present were either invited to contribute 
solutions to solve, or were instructed to remedy in specific ways. With reference to the 
issue with the helmets, safety was also closely related to ‘responsibility’ and surveillance 
as ways to deal with, or even solve, the risks at stake. As such, cooperating about safety is 
mostly about solving problems and not about engaging with the workers knowledge about 




Morning break meetings 
In addition to the safety meetings, and as part of a company strategy for the safety 
management of their building sites, the main contractor at Site 1 ran weekly morning break 
meetings. These meetings took place during the morning break at 9 o'clock with all 
workers from different sub-contractors present. According to the health and safety director, 
the aim of these meetings was to involve all the workers from different sub-contractors 
more directly and to facilitate dialogue between the workers. Prior to these meetings, the 
site safety manager walked the site and rated different target points related to health and 
safety using an online rating system available on an IPad. At times during the site walk, he 
approached the workers directly if something, which he found risky, caught his attention. 
However, at other times he just registered the issue for the next meeting, where he used the 
pictures he had taken to illustrate safety breaches or issues where improvements were 
needed in order to meet rules or standards. He also complimented the workers if safety 
standards were met, e.g. in relation to clearing the access roads on the site.   
 
The morning break meetings provoked different reactions from the workers from the sub-
contractors. Some felt that the meetings strengthened relations across different contractors, 
but the practice of showing pictures of situations, where some sort of breach of rules had 
taken place or risk was at stake, was largely seen as counterproductive in relation to safety. 
One of the workers asked us, "how can showing the pictures at meetings two days later, 
improve safety? Instead of embarrassing me at the meeting, he should get to me on the 
spot, so I could've corrected it". Seen from the perspective of this worker, taking pictures 
and showing them later amounts to a form of embarrassment, and does nothing to 
collaborate about safety, or to improve safety onsite. It illustrates that understandings of 
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safety, as well as what it takes to cooperate about safety to reduce risk, are multiple and 
contested. It poses the question of whether safety is about dealing with problems and 
solutions when encountered in the course of one’s work, or about correcting behaviour 
through a disciplinary management (power of surveillance). Are such practices creating a 
culture of self-surveillance or encouraging workers to evade the lens of the camera?   
 
The negative reactions to having photos shown at the morning break meetings illustrates 
how the power of management (to use a disciplining gaze and to punish through 
embarrassment) is dependent on the safety knowledge which classifies poor behaviour.  
This knowledge takes on its authority because of the uneven power relationships with the 
workers (Foucault 1980). What is disputed here, though, is not the taking of pictures, but 
the fact that the risk is isolated from real time and its immediate context, only to be put into 
another time frame, namely the safety meeting. For the worker this represents an entirely 
different context which, to a certain extent, renders the issue of safety irrelevant. It appears 
that part of the disciplinary apparatus is the morning break meeting, through which the 
knowledge about the risk (in the picture) is legitimized by experts/authorities/the company, 
in the way the identified safety breaches have been withheld and then revealed to the 
workers in a new context.   
 
In safety management and legal terms, safety meetings are meant to stage cooperation and 
collaboration about safety across contractors and hierarchical levels at the construction site. 
In the example above, the safety manager failed in his safety duty by photographing an 
unsafe act/ situation without engaging with the worker(s) at the time to either comment 
upon the situation and / or correct it if needed. The discussion later in this section indicates 
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that the worker 'shamed' at the morning meeting did raise a similar point.  Even though the 
safety meetings are communicated in a discourse of engagement (Sherratt et al. 2013), we 
have seen in the previous examples that, from the point of view of the workers from the 
sub-contractor, actual risks are not managed or remedied but rather transferred to a meeting 
where a perpetrator is identified. Through choosing not to engage with the individual/s at 
the sight/site of hazards and poor safety practice, the manager can be seen as making the 
workers “an object of observation but never a subject of communication” (Foucault 1977, 
p.200). In the example, the worker does not have the opportunity to react towards the 
hazard being pointed out – so that he could correct or manage the risk in real time. That 
risk is not dealt with in its original context, but rather identified in a meeting in which the 
worker feels it is associated with him as an individual problem. Through talking to the 
safety manager, we learned that this understanding of the meeting and the consequences of 
taking photographs, were very far from his own intentions, which were to construct a space 
for dialogue about general problems and safety issues and to foster organizational learning.  
 
Stabbed to the management: balancing without the safety line    
In our conversations with personnel on site, we regularly discussed what feeling safe at 
work means to them. These conversations were often initiated by our inquiries about why 
they had chosen a certain procedure over another for a certain job, and what it potentially 
could mean for safety. For a period of two weeks we followed workers at Site 2 who 
mounted concrete floors and walls three floors up the building. Two of them worked in 
close pairs together with the crane operator and they described trust in colleagues and 
knowledge of their partners’ work tasks and whereabouts as essential for their sense of 
security in what they did. As the floors were installed, they followed a certain procedure 
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for installing edge protection as part of finalizing the floor. This was something that the 
site manager had also pointed out as being important, since it would take some time before 
the walls were in place. While completing this procedure, the workers used safety lines, a 
so called “yo-yo”, but at some point we noticed that one of the workers was installing the 
edge protection without using safety lines. The safety manager happened to walk past and 
immediately called the worker over to ask where his protection was. The incident resulted 
in an immediate disciplinary talk with the two colleagues. We did not take part in this talk, 
but the site manager, and later the foreman, expressed ‘frustration’ and ‘disappointment’ 
with the workers. They felt that they had no choice but to enforce the rules and discipline 
them for not behaving safely, even though, as the foreman said, he was certain that the 
workers did not feel unsafe when working as they did.   
 
Later, when we discussed the incident with the workers, one of them sarcastically said that 
he would not talk to us because we had “stabbed him” to the management. While he said 
this in a joking manner, he mentioned it again and again. We explained that we had not 
said anything about how they worked to management, but his distrust highlighted how our 
own “inspecting gaze” had (unwittingly) been linked with the system of safety surveillance 
(and discipline) present onsite. As we were visitors and observers at site, we became 
associated with the inspection of safety. But as we hung around the site, the two workers 
told us that they had previously asked for the safety lines and, when these did not arrive, 
they reasoned that the decision was made because the company wanted to save money. 
They said that it felt like a joke when the foreman said that they should ‘just ask’ if they 
needed something. They did not think there was much of a conversation to be had with the 
management, describing how “it was more like being stopped by the police for speeding”. 
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When we talked to the foreman about this incident, he felt the workers accusation was 
unjust, and stressed that the workers knew his prioritization of safety. He claimed to have 
heard nothing about the missing yo-yo’s. When asked why he thought the safety line was 
not being used, the foreman said that, in his mind, it was because, “they don’t feel it’s risky 
without it”.       
  
One of the other workers mounting concrete elements explained how he, in fact, felt at 
greater risk with safety lines. When he was mounting without a safety railing, he claimed 
that he was very attentive and took great care. He felt that it was important to be able to 
react and move his body fast if one of the elements caught a gust of wind and suddenly 
moved in an unexpected direction. Therefore, if he needed to jump to one side or the other 
he was concerned that the safety line would lock him and impair his mobility. While many 
health and safety practitioners would argue the very opposite, the worker felt that the 
safety line could be the very thing that made him feel insecure.   
 
These examples illustrate how dealing with risk, and choosing work procedures to avoid 
risk, is anchored in different discourses or notions of what safety is and how it can be 
achieved. It seems that, for the workers, whether they used the yo-yo or not did make a big 
difference, albeit in a different way than that anticipated from the safety management. The 
use of it made the worker feel unsafe; and the non-use of it brought about a penalty to the 
worker. As Sherratt et al. (2013) have noted in their study, the breach of safety rules was 
not “associated (with) danger or the potential for any real incident or injury” by the 
workers (ibid, p.631). In our example, the workers anchored their sense of safety at work 
in trusting colleagues’ competent handling of their tasks. Safety, therefore, is established in 
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a relational practice of trust, contingent on seeing and communicating with each other. 
Therefore, from the perspective of some workers, a focus only on the safety line and its use 
diverts the talk about safety to essentially irrelevant things distanced from the everyday 
concerns of the workers. Instead, safety becomes a question of management’s judgement 
on their way of handling the task; a decision from the health and safety professional 
function, made from a position of disciplinary power.   
Safety cooperation as the negotiation of rules 
  
Rule-violations were common place at the two sites, both in the sense that safety managers 
would routinely identify and log violations, and in the sense that violations were 
normalized as part of the daily practice (Sherratt et al. 2013, Vaughan 2005). Whether 
rules were followed, or not followed, was negotiated in practice, as is illustrated in the 
following quote where we asked the manager of the gangers about the safety precautions 
under crane operation:   
 
Interviewer: When you assemble concrete elements using the crane, at other sites I have 
noticed that it is forbidden for other workers to enter the area. 
Ganger: That’s forbidden here too. 
Interviewer: But you enter anyway, don't you? 
Ganger: Yeah, but we probably shouldn't. If it's right, there should've been a chain around, 
I think. There should be a chain around the pallets too, where the elements stand, where 
they pull up the elements, which is where there should have been a chain around. 
Interviewer: Yes, is that the rule?   
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Ganger: I think so. 
Interviewer: Okay, but you don't put it here? 
Ganger: No, no.  
                                            (Interview with manager of the gangers) 
 
In his position as a lower level manager, his primary job is to organize the work on a daily 
basis and ensure that the gangers have materials and tools. He is not a representative in the 
formal safety meetings and from the quote it is apparent that his vision is not specifically 
guided towards safety. Rather, he has divided safety into two different realms; one 
comprising the theoretical knowledge of rules and what is forbidden, and another based on 
what they actually do. In the beginning he confirms the formal understanding of safety, ("it 
is forbidden here too"). When the interviewer "guides" his vision towards the fact that 
there are no safety chains, the manager confirms this, and even brings the interviewer’s 
attention to an additional issue, where another chain is not in place. During fieldwork and 
observations, we often heard the phrase, "(R)ightly, there should have been…", indicating 
that rule- violation was common practice onsite.    
 
At other times, rule- violation, or attempts to divert the management’s attention away from 
rule- violation, was elaborate and articulate. A group of cast concrete gangers from the 
sub- contractor told us that before the safety walks they would "leave some garbage and 
left over materials in the access way for the safety manager to have something to 
register'". This, they said, would make the safety manager less attentive to other violations, 
such as a lack of sufficient railing, which they preferred that he did not see. In this case, 
neither the left over materials nor the other violations were understood as a real threat to 
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safety; it was rather a risk that could be dealt with easily in the course of their work. This 
understanding can be compared to what Dekker (2014) has described as a general 
experience of "we'll probably be fine" (Dekker 2014, p.15). Safety in the form of pointing 
out risks and faults is seen as decoupled from actions that relate meaningfully to 
establishing a sense of security in the course of work. Despite this sense of disconnection, 
workers own actions actually furthers this separation; they leave out something for the 
manager to register whereby 'he can do the task he has been assigned', as they formulated 
it. This example also seems to represent a tactic: to outwit management. It acts as a counter 
to the management attempts to rarefy safety (e.g. logging safety violations and revealing 
them later to admonish workers). Instead, this action of 'leaving something for them to 
register' suggests the workers consider themselves as having a better understanding of 
working safely and of the real motivations of safety managers, namely, that management 
does not appropriately understand hazards and the management of risk. On the other hand, 
the site safety manager told us that he was perfectly aware of these differences in 
understanding, and that he even took part in the negotiations about how to do the work 
safely on site. In his experience, it was difficult to balance 'independence and grip' with the 
workers. He exemplified this by telling us that, even when things had not been cleared up 
on site and represented a risk when left lying around (including cut iron, remnants of 
equipment to put the moulds or formwork together, and waste), he sometimes took the 
view that "it is necessary not to point out everything, because 'they should be allowed to 
work". Thus, the manager sometimes withholds the findings of his surveillance, or chose 




The main contractor at Site 1 had a reputation for being quite fierce on policing the use of 
safety equipment; and most hotly debated and challenged was the introduction of 
mandatory personal protection gear onsite such as safety goggles and work gloves. Their 
focus on this was a part of a larger change in the company's approach to safety 
management and accident prevention which was first implemented some years ago. Yet, at 
the time of our fieldwork there were still workers and sub-contractor managers that were 
opposed to this approach, and thus the safety manager confronted workers for not using the 
equipment. However, one of the sub-contractors felt that these precautions were actually 
negotiable, as the following quote illustrates:    
 
Sub-contractor: …they introduced safety goggles as obligatory safety equipment. There 
was no discussion, and that's fine. But, I opened the discussion and asked them what if it is 
damp? … I know, you can get some safety goggles... but if you do a certain job, you have 
to look carefully. It just gives a different view with goggles. 'Well, then you will have to 
take them off', they said to me.  
Interviewer: Ok, you actually negotiated a dispensation, you can say? 
Sub-contractor: Yes. 
Interviewer: And how does this work for your people, with that dispensation? 
Sub-contractor: Well, honestly they are probably quick to see the moisture, to put it 
frankly. They are quick to take off the goggles. (Foreman sub- contractor Site 1) 
 
For the foreman, the safety goggles hinder a clear view, and this is what he brings forward 
to the main contractor safety manager. The personal protective gear is not sanctioned by 
law, and therefore the company is required to explain the reasons behind their particular 
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PPE requirements. However, for the main contractor this also became very difficult to 
administer, and at several times the safety manager was frustrated and irritated at the 
workers’ behaviour. From his perspective they were undermining their own safety as well 
as his authority, which required these measures to be used. The different notions of the 
‘safety’ of safety goggles illustrates well how attempts to engage with workers views and 
the granting of dispensation from safety standards created a sense of insecurity for the 
manager, whereas the very use of the goggles created an insecurity felt by the workers. 
 
Discussion: Between facilitating independence or tightening the grip 
Our research has attempted to empirically unpack the phenomenon of disciplining unsafe 
behaviour and of engaging with local safety knowledge and how it unfolds as construction 
workers and management cooperate around safety. The analysis can provide a point of 
departure from existing ways of thinking about safety cooperation and enactment of rules 
in three different ways, which we will now unpack.  
 
Firstly, the analysis confirms the importance of understanding the difference between 
safety as safer work practices for front line workers and safety as adherence to, and 
knowledge of, comprehensive safety rules. This has consistently been pointed out in the 
literature, but our study reveals the implications of confusing the two during different 
attempts to achieve and engage in ‘safety cooperation’. The findings suggest that current 
management practices, as they were observed, commonly ‘dress up’ enforcement as 




Secondly, the analysis points to the relevance of drawing on local knowledge when 
attempting to delineate engagement from enforcement in safety cooperation. We have 
described how construction involves interacting in a recognizable environment that might 
be reconstituted in rather different configurations for different jobs, drawing on a situated 
and inherently hierarchical body of construction knowing, experienced and mobilized in 
practice. This body of knowing includes trust in colleagues as an inherent part of practicing 
safe work on site. Safety is being constructed by the different safety management and 
safety culture programmes through the language of involvement and engagement, but the 
issue of trust, as a part of safety, may be overlooked. However, there is still the retention of 
management control, as opposed to an active engagement with local knowledge, for the 
management of safety and prevention of accidents. Where engagement and participation 
are sought, there is still frequently more of a monologue rather than a dialogue over safety   
and this challenges the finely balanced relations of trust at a worksite.   
 
Thirdly, the analysis points to safety as a privileged and powered practice, which explains 
the persistence of enforcement practices and the skepticism towards worker engagement 
around safety. We concur with Antonsen (2009), who argues that issues of power in safety 
management are under- communicated, and occasionally disguised as ‘prioritisation’. 
Provan and colleagues point to the prioritizing of professional safety work being ‘based on 
the wants and needs of management, not the current risk faced by the front- line 
workforce’ (Provan et al. 2019:285). Cooperation about safety thus becomes centered 
around formal safety management: i.e. a safety audit of an operational business unit, the 
purpose of this can be predominantly about demonstrating the appropriate performance of 
the safety team, through reporting the inadequate performance of operations (ibid, p.280). 
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Cooperation about safety is intended to involve all construction parties and is sanctioned 
by regulations, but achieving this poses a significant challenge with regards to accounting 
for the competing types of safety knowledge at work; some (locally developed) notions of 
safety and risk are considered to be safer than other formal, safety management systems 
and policy, which means that cooperation becomes an exercise of some workers adjusting 
their knowledge, views and experiences to fit other understandings and priorities. Viewing 
safety as a practice, therefore, points to the importance of considering all participants 
views, and it also points to the fact that these competing views are contextually negotiated 
and developed in practice.     
 
Within the formal structure of cooperation, we did, perhaps unsurprisingly, find resistance 
towards management views and knowledge. In a group interview with workers from one of 
the subcontractors at Site 1, we were told about how they had been asked to take 
photographs of things that were deemed unsafe or wrong according to a safety induction 
they had just participated in. In the beginning, workers assumed that they should identify 
an instance where one of the other craftsmen had made a mistake and take a photo of it; an 
activity which they felt uncomfortable doing. Later on, they learned that they should think 
about their own practice, and even take pictures of good ideas or safe solutions. Yet, such 
initiatives for encouraging reflexivity and engagement in safety were met with suspicion. 
Within the context of safety onsite, the taking of photos was already a problematic activity 
and charged with distrust courtesy of the ‘picture showing’ practice already discussed in 
the example of the morning break meetings. In this situation, the workers felt that they 
were also indoctrinated into this way of identifying faults and risks (and even good ideas) 
as a way of demonstrating their ‘right’ understanding of safety. This points to how safety 
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knowledge is wielded onsite. In this way safety breaches are catalogued (identified, 
concealed and then revealed) not only by management, but also by colleagues in order to 
demonstrate their understanding of company views. This represents a means of rarefying 
safety and utilizing it as a management function; a (privileged) way of seeing and a 
knowledgebase used to admonish. From the safety management's perspective, pointing out 
mishaps and errors onsite is understood as a general practice, intended to foster dialogue, 
engagement and even independent discretion among the workers and not something 
directed at individuals.   
 
Again, in relation to Foucault, this can be seen as an attempt to engage individual workers 
in self-surveillance and self-discipline. Workers described these actions as “informing on 
colleagues” and “pointing out an error”. In this way, a culture of monitoring and reporting 
of unsafe actions, poor workmanship, corner-cutting and indiscretions, may represent a 
proactive safety culture. Even in articulating their displeasure and unease with this 
approach, the workers acknowledge that it is “finding faults”. Yet, it is also an example of 
power being normalised through everyday practice which Foucault (1978), in relation to 
the managing of a population, terms "biopower". This might take the form of a system of 
‘normalization’ where hazards caused by fellow workers are identified in a self-regulatory 
manner, and then formally logged and measured. This is a move, in relation to hazard 
report card systems, which Tutt et al. (2011, p.8) warn risks confusing the "don’t walk by" 
ethos of safety cooperation. Yet in our empirical research these practices do not seem to 
represent 'docile bodies' enacting a change in safety culture. Rather, there is resistance to 





Such forms of horizontal monitoring may be premised on enhancing worker engagement 
and empowerment. Yet Sewell’s work (1998, 2012) details how such disciplinary 
apparatus can operate to reward high performers and expose others and shows that workers 
are very conscious of conflicts in managerial discourse. Rather than a democratic practice, 
it can become a process “whereby peer- pressure enforces management-inspired group 
norms on an individual basis” (Zureik 2003, p. 44).  
 
In this analysis we have questioned the notion of establishing what is ‘right’ with regards 
to safety practice. Rather than one right way of achieving safety, we have pointed to 
different, local, notions of what safe work is about, and the efforts brought into managing 
the processes that should create or support these practices. Tightening the grip on safety 
compliance could represent a way of achieving that, but our analysis points to the risk of 
contra productive practices, i.e. in relation to the safety line, where the workers felt policed 
rather than safe by how the management reacted. Facilitating independence, with regard to 
cooperation about creating safer work practices, seems to be possible through engaging 
with local knowledge. At the two sites, the site safety managers explicitly expressed a 
willingness to engage with workers, but when faced with ‘rule breaking’ practices, they 
went back to enforcing rather than engaging with their reasoning and sense of order (Busby 
and Iszatt-White 2016). The existence of multiple opinions and conflicting views could 
support the managers’ intent to engage and serve as a form of requisite variety that will 
enable the legitimization of safety work directed towards the safety of workers and not 
towards safety work (Antonsen 2009). On a further note, striking the balance between 
enforcement and engagement can even be seen as an impossible task. Rather, the real 
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challenge is to accept the decoupling between the two in order to be able to work with the 
inconsistencies that they produce in practice. Holt and colleagues have, based on fieldwork 
in a different context, pointed to the importance of nurturing ‘soft power’ skills in 
managers, such as problem solving skills, coordinating skills, flexibility, deep knowledge 
of the system they operate in, and willingness to undertake emotional labour associated 
with relational working (Holt et al. 2018). Attempts to engage the workers, through safety 
committee meetings or morning break meetings, became translated into the one-way 
provision of information and praising or addressing of how things were done. Therefore a 
new form of engagement with the local conceptions of safe working, that opens up and 
allows for differences of opinion, could possibly facilitate independence.   
Conclusions  
This study feeds into the discussion of how to bring about change in construction safety 
and of whether safety in construction is achieved through engagement or enforcement, or 
rather how these two perspectives unfold empirically. Through a perspective of safety as a 
local practice we have pointed out how safety tends to be legitimized as a privileged risk-
oriented vision, used to admonish workers. The paradox inherent in this is that managers 
attempt to engage the workers through participating in meetings and taking photos of 
mistakes, while workers see these practices as a punitive way of criticising their work at a 
distance. They, in turn, feel such practices run counter to establishing collaborative safety 
practices on site. Identifying mistakes and faults through an inspecting gaze is something 
that workers are resigned to accepting onsite, and yet they effectively reject it as 
meaningfully contributing to safe practice. Rather than interiorizing this understanding of 




The findings suggest that current safety management practices, as they were observed, 
'dress up' enforcement as engagement and that breeds a degree of resentment and distrust 
among the workforce. This can be viewed as being poor management practices premised 
on a lack of understanding of how safety is understood by front line workers among the 
management ranks. However, rather than a lack of understanding, site managers are not 
well equipped to manage the apparent inconsistencies between safety as managed 
procedures and safety as handled through tacit professionalised knowledge.  
 
Through this analysis, based on ethnographic data, we have empirically unpacked the 
difference between disciplining unsafe behavior, where behaviour is judged on the basis of 
standardized norms of risk (fragmentation), and engaging with dynamic and local 
knowledge integrated in personal, material and organizational practices. Applying the 
Foucauldian notion of discipline allows for an examination of the hierarchy of safety 
understandings in the context of a construction company, and at the same time it sheds 
light on the 'rule-breaking' practice, as workers do not always see the behavior sanctioned 
by the management as producing better health and safety onsite. Even if facilitating 
independence and engaged cooperation among workers was an aim for the main 
contractors at the two sites, these efforts were countered by a sense of being watched or 
blamed by some of the workers. These judgments (of poor safety practice) were made from 
the (privileged) position of safety management and in a process where safety knowledge 
was unreachable and unknowable to workers outside the confines of the safety meetings. 
This study shows how engaging workers in safer ways of working should acknowledge the 
integrated nature of safety practice and the value placed on independence and trust when 
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cooperating about safety. We have used Foucault’s concept of surveillance to highlight 
aspects of enforcement that produce resentment rather than engagement in workers. We 
point to the importance of employing ‘soft power’ skills such as problem solving skills and 
willingness to undertake emotional labour associated with relational working in managers, 
as a way to open up for the co-functioning of engagement and enforcement in construction. 
In a Danish context of strong labour union cooperation and involvement of workers, this 
seems especially pertinent. Bearing in mind how the attempts to engage the workers, in 
safety committee meetings or morning break meetings, seemingly turned out to be more 
about the simple giving of information, and praising or addressing how things were done, a 
new form of engagement with the local, contextualised ways of perceiving safe working, 
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